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THE BUCK STOPS HERE: PREEMPTION OF
THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS BY THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT
Thomas F. O'Neil III, Esq.*
Adam H. Charnes, Esq.**
Shannon Thee Hanson, Esq.***
During the past ten years, both the United States and individual
whistleblowers have relied with increasing fervor on the False Claims Act
("FCA" or the "Act") to impose civil liability on those persons or entities
who allegedly seek to raid federal coffers through the presentation of
false or fraudulent claims for payments.' Since 1986, over 1,100 qui tam
2
cases have been filed, with a total civil fraud recovery of more than $1
billion.3 With its provisions for treble damages and mandatory civil pen-
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1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732 (1988).
2. Qui tam is the abbreviation for the phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
seipso"-he who as much for the king as for himself. Under the FCA and other statutes
which authorize qui tam actions, a private person, often referred to as a qui tam relator, is
allowed to bring a civil action on behalf of the United States. As a reward for their assist-
ance in the discovery and prosecution of fraudulent claims against the federal government,
qui tam relators are offered a "bounty," e.g., a percentage of any monies recovered from
the defendant in the qui tam action. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988); see also Note, The His-
tory and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83 (1972).
3. DEPARTmNT oF JusTicE, Justice Department Recovers Over $1 Billion in Qui Tam
Awards and Settlements, Oct. 18, 1995, at 1, 4 (press release) [hereinafter D.O.J. PRESS
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alties of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each false or fraudulent claim,4
the FCA has become a sword of Damocles over the heads of organiza-
tions and industries heavily dependent upon governmental purchases of,
or payments for, their products. While qui tam litigation initially arose
most frequently in cases involving United States Department of Defense
contracts, recent exponential expansions in federal disbursements for
health care services and products have sparked an explosion of qui tam
litigation in that arena.5 In the six-month period ending March 31, 1995,
the government recouped $101 million in civil penalties for alleged health
care fraud through actions brought under both the Civil Monetary Pen-
alty Law ("CMPL") 6 and the FCA.7
I. INTRODUCTION
In many health care-related lawsuits under the FCA, multiple parties in
the distribution chain are potentially liable for causing a false claim to be
presented to a federal agency. Consequently, practitioners are confronted
with the common and complex threat that their client will be named as a
third-party defendant and impleaded in an FCA action initially filed
against another individual or entity. Mindful of this possibility, counsel
must thoroughly evaluate the potential liability and litigation expenses
when seeking to resolve threatened or asserted FCA claims. Because
third-party claims often obstruct the execution of the congressional pur-
poses and objectives in enacting the FCA, they may be barred by the
doctrine of "conflict preemption." Moreover, even if a particular court
RELEASE]; see also Joann Gambale & Jeffrey E. Richardson, Eighth Survey of White Collar
Crime-Substantive Crimes, False Claims, 30 Am. CraM. L. Rv. 643, 652-54 (1993).
4. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
5. See generally David C. Hsia, Application of Qui Tam to the Quality of Health Care,
14 J. LEGAL MED. 301 (1993). More than 20% of the qui tam cases filed since the 1986
amendments have involved allegations of fraud perpetrated on the United States Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. See Statistics Under the Qui Tam Provisions of the
False Claims Act Amendments of 1986,62 FED. CoNT. REP. 505-06, 515 (1994) [hereinafter
Statistics].
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1988). The CMPL authorizes administrative proceedings
against persons who submit false or improper claims under Medicare and Medicaid
programs.
7. See Semiannual Report of the Department of Health and Human Services Office
of Inspector General (Oct. 1, 1994 - Mar. 31, 1995) [hereinafter Semiannual Report]. The
health care field is only one of several industries where qui tam litigation poses a significant
threat; qui tam recoveries in all sectors have increased dramatically in recent years. In
fiscal year 1987, the government recouped approximately $200,000 from actions filed by
qui tam relators. By fiscal year 1995, annual government recoveries had increased to $243
million. See D.O.J. PRESS RELEASE, supra note 3, at 4.
The Buck Stops Here
concludes that preemption is unavailable, other procedural avenues
should be considered to protect a client's flanks.
A. Purposes and Elements of the FCA
The civil False Claims Act was enacted in 1863 to address rampant
fraud perpetrated against the government by Civil War defense contrac-
tors." The purposes of the Act remain the same today: (1) to ensure the
integrity of federal programs and the public fisc by deterring submissions
to the government of false or fraudulent claims; (2) to provide restitution
to the government of money taken from it by fraud; and (3) to punish
those who defraud the United States.9
Despite its long history and several amendments, the Act was little
more than a dusty lance in the government's armory until the past dec-
ade.10 In response to a perceived increase in fraud against the federal
government in the early 1980s, as well as the recognition that the compli-
ance and prevention measures then in place were inadequate, Congress
enacted the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986.11 These far-reaching
revisions "made [the FCA] the weapon of first choice in combatting fraud
in virtually every program involving federal funds."'" Central to these
amendments was the addition of monetary incentives for private individ-
8. False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863); see also Rainwater v. United States,
356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958) (holding that the objective of Congress in passing the Act was to
protect government funds and property from fraudulent claims); S. REp. No. 345, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,5273. The Act was originally
known as the "Informer's Act" and "Lincoln Law." JoHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS
AND Qui TAM AcIONS 1-3 (Supp. 1994).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 315-17 (1976); In re Common-
wealth Cos. Inc., 913 F.2d 518, 525-26 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. O'Connell, 890 F.2d
563, 568 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. McLeod, 721 F.2d 282, 285 (9th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Warning, No. Civ.A.93-4541,1994 WL 396432, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 1994); In re
Selma Apparel Corp., 132 B.R. 968, 970 (S.D. Ala. 1991); United States ex rel. Stinson,
Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 721 F. Supp.
1247, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
10. See Kent D. Strader, Note, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers: Should Counter-
claims Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs be Allowed in False Claims Act Cases?, 62 U. CIN. L.
REv. 713, 727 (1993).
11. Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3733 (1988)).
12. See BOESE, supra note 8, at 1-3; see also United States v. Ettrick Wood Prods., 683
F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (W.D. Wis. 1988) ("The increased penalties in the 1986 amendments
... indicate that Congress sought both to deter the increasingly pervasive and severe prob-
lem of fraud and to enhance the government's ability to recover losses sustained as a result
of fraud."); United States v. Hill, 676 F. Supp. 1158, 1166-68 (N.D. Fla. 1987) (providing a
thorough review of the 1986 amendments and their legislative history).
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uals-known as qui tam relators-to ferret out fraud and bring it to the
attention of the federal government. Not surprisingly, the 1986 amend-
ments to the FCA have proven to be a litigation tinderbox; the recent
proliferation of qui tam actions is, in a word, staggering.13
B. Penalties under the FCA
The current version of the FCA imposes civil liability on any person or
entity who, inter alia, "knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to
an officer or employee of the United States government ... a false or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval" 4 or who "knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the government."'" The
Act imposes liability of three times the damages sustained by the govern-
ment as a result of the presentation of false or fraudulent claims, as well
as a mandatory civil penalty of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each
claim. 6 Generally, when more than one person has violated the FCA,
each is jointly and severally liable for the penalties and damages
imposed.17
C. The Qui Tam Mechanism
Section 3730 of the FCA allows a private person, often referred to as
the qui tam relator, to bring a civil action on behalf of the United States
for a violation of the FCA.'8 The qui tam provisions are procedural only;
they do not change the elements of, or damages and penalties for, an
FCA claim.' 9 The legislative intent underlying the qui tam mechanism is
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1988).
15. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988). This penalty is mandatory and cannot be decreased
even if the false claim in question was for a minimal sum. See, e.g., United States v.
Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 286 n.1 (7th Cir. 1978). If imposition of the statutory penalties
follows a conviction under the criminal False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287, however, those
penalties may violate the Eighth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-51 (1989).
17. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988); see also United States v. CFW Constr. Co., 649 F.
Supp. 616, 618 (D. S.C. 1986); BoEsE, supra note 8, at 2-94.
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (1988).
19. Because the relator institutes suit on behalf of the United States, he cannot assert
any claims on his own behalf or other claims on behalf of the United States alleging, for
example, common law fraud, unjust enrichment, or violations of other federal statutes.
BOESE, supra note 8, at 1-29, 1-30. The one exception to this rule is an allegation of em-
ployment retaliation based on lawful actions committed by the relator that, inter alia, fur-
ther the investigation or initiation of an FCA action. Relief available for a retaliation
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to provide incentives for "whistleblowers" to assist the federal govern-
ment in the discovery and prosecution of fraudulent claims by offering
them a "bounty," i.e., a percentage of any monies recovered from the
defendant in the FCA suit.20 By empowering individuals to act as "pri-
vate attorneys general," Congress hoped to punish and deter fraud and
abuse in industries dependent upon United States government programs.
To initiate 'a qui tam action, the relator must file, in camera, the com-
plaint alleging a violation of the FCA and then serve the government with
a copy of the complaint as well as a written disclosure of substantially all
of the material evidence and information the relator possesses regarding
his or her allegations.2 The complaint remains under seal for at least
sixty days,22 while the government reviews the bases for the action and
determines whether to intervene23 and assume primary responsibility for
prosecuting the case or to notify the court of its decision not to intervene,
thereby leaving the relator with the right to pursue his claims.2 4
If the government intervenes in a qui tam action, the relator typically is
entitled to receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the pro-
ceeds of the action or settlement of the claim. 5 If the government de-
cides not to intervene, the relator who successfully prosecutes or settles
claim includes reinstatement, two times the back pay to which the relator is entitled, com-
pensation for special damages, and litigation costs, including attorneys' fees. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(h) (1988).
20. [The FCA] was passed upon the theory, based on experience as old as modem
civilization, that one of the least expensive and most effective means of prevent-
ing frauds on the Treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by
private persons acting.., under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or the
hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with the ordinary
methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel.
United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885), quoted in False Claim Amend-
ments Act of 1986, S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5276.
21. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (1988).
22. Id
23. Id. The FCA specifically prohibits persons other than the government from inter-
vening in a qui tam lawsuit or bringing a related action based on the facts underlying the
pending litigation. Id § 3730(b)(5) (1988).
24. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(A)-(c)(1). Prior to the 1986 amendments, qui tam relators were
not guaranteed any continued role in an FCA litigation once the government intervened in
the case. Moreover, determination of their portion of any award obtained was subject to
the discretion of the court, which often awarded the relators only a "tiny fraction" of the
proceeds of the FCA action. See BoEsE, supra note 8, at 1-22, 1-23.
25. Id § 3730(d)(1) (1988). Where, however, the court finds that the action is "based
primarily on disclosures of specific information" from sources other than the relator, the
court, in its discretion, may award any sum which it considers "appropriate, but in no case
more than 10 percent of the proceeds ... ." Id.
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the action is entitled to "an amount which the court decides is reason-
able," but not less than twenty-five percent nor more than thirty percent
of the proceeds of the action.26 These reward provisions create the po-
tential for significant monetary gain.27
The detailed restitution, penalty, and qui tam provisions of the FCA as
described above, evidence a congressional intent to enact a comprehen-
sive federal scheme to deter and punish perpetrators of fraud on the gov-
ernment. In the hands of government and private litigants, however, this
precise statutory blueprint for combating fraud is often overlaid with a
multitude of superficially similar, yet fundamentally extraneous, state law
claims.28 First, qui tam defendants often file state law counterclaims
against relators in an attempt to deflect a portion of their FCA exposure.
Most cases examining the FCA's preemptive scope have arisen in this
context. Second, defendants in FCA actions frequently assert state law
26. Id. § 3730(d)(2).
27. See S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5266-67 ("The... legislation seeks.., to encourage any individual knowing of Govern-
ment fraud to bring that information forward."). Relators have received more than $187
million in recoveries; the largest qui tam recovery by a relator is $22.5 million by a former
vice-president of finance at United Technologies Corporation. D.O.J. PRESS RELEASE,
supra note 3, at 3.
28. Additionally, because of the evidentiary burden posed by the scienter element of
FCA claims, the United States often pairs them with federal common law causes of action
that permit single damages; see, e.g., United States v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 795 F. Supp.
1131 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (recognizing additional claims such as unjust enrichment, payment
after mistake of fact, and breach of contract); United States v. Incorporated Village of
Island Park, 791 F. Supp. 354, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing claims such as fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, and erroneous payment of funds, as well as
FCA claims); United States v. Kensington Hosp., 760 F. Supp. 1120, 1123 (E.D. Pa. 1991)(recognizing claims such as fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, mistake of
fact, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation, as well as FCA
claims); see also UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIvIL DIvIsIoN, CIVIL FRAUD MONO-
GRAPH 226-34 (Nov. 1988), 3 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 4-4.700A (1994 Supp.)[hereinafter CIVIL FRAUD MONoGRAPH] (summarizing potentially applicable federal com-
mon law causes of action). Under such circumstances, counsel should consider arguing
that the FCA abrogated such federal common law causes of action. See Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981) (noting that the courts presume that congressional
enactments displace preexisting federal common law); Mortgages, Inc. v. United States
Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209, 213 (1991) ("Where... Congress has enacted a comprehensive
legislative scheme, including integrated procedures for enforcement, there is a strong pre-
sumption that Congress did not intend the courts to supplement the remedies enacted.");
cf. In re Moffit, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 864 F. Supp. 527,542-43 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding
that the United States' state law claims for conversion and detinue were preempted by the
federal forfeiture statutes). But see CIVI. FRAUD MONOGRAPH, supra, at 224-26 (arguing
that the United States' federal common law remedies for false claims survive enactment of
the FCA).
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third-party claims against others potentially responsible for the fraud.
Given the rise in governmental use of the FCA to combat fraud, these
claims undoubtedly will increase in the future.
The institution of state law causes of action does not further the FCA's
goals of deterrence and punishment of fraud on the government. Rather,
by focusing the attention of the courts away from the central elements of
the purported FCA violation, companion state law causes of action inter-
fere directly with the methods by which the FCA was designed to reach
its ideas. In particular, the third-party practice involving new claims and
parties is simply a mechanism used by those accused of fraud under the
FCA to circumvent the statute's implicit prohibition against shifting the
financial burden of FCA liability to others. Accordingly, these third-
party claims run afoul of Congress' intent in enacting the FCA and should
be preempted.
D. Third-Party Claims in Federal Court
Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs third-party
practice in federal court. Under that provision, a defendant in a civil ac-
tion may fie a third-party complaint against "a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of
the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff."29 It is not sufficient
that the defendant's claim against the third party "arises from the same
transaction or set of facts as the original claim."30 Rather, the third-party
29. FED. R. Crv. P. 14(a). Leave of court to serve the third-party complaint is required
unless it is filed within 10 days after the third-party plaintiff serves its original answer to the
complaint. Id. This requirement, however, is intended for the benefit of the parties to the
initial action, not the putative third-party defendant. See, &g., Nelson v. Quimby Island
Reclamation Dist. Facilities Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1364, 1387 n.48 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Hensley
v. United States, 45 F.R.D. 352, 353 (D. Mont. 1968). Moreover, local district court rules
often impose further time limits on the filing of third-party complaints, though the district
court typically retains discretion to waive such restrictions. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N.
Am. v. Morrison, 148 F.R.D. 295,296 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (applying a local rule requiring that
a motion for leave to join a third-party be filed within six months of service of the movant's
answer or at least 60 days before the scheduled trial date, whichever is earlier); Franken-
field v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A.90-6928, 1991 WL 257084, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
25, 1991) (applying a local rule that provides that a motion to join a third-party "will ordi-
narily be denied as untimely unless filed not more than ninety days after the service of the
moving party's answer").
30. 6 CHAR.us A. WRirHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1446, at
378-79 (1990); see, eg., Ez-Tixz, Inc. v. I-it-Tix, Inc., No. Crv.A.93-3791, 1995 WL 77589, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1995) (noting that "third-party plaintiffs' reliance on common trans-
actions or operative facts arising from the two complaints, as being dispositive under Rule
14, is simply misplaced"); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Portnoy, No. Civ.A.92-
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complaint must attempt to transfer to the third-party the liability asserted
against the third-party plaintiff in the main action."' Since Rule 14 itself
is merely a procedural device and does not "abridge, enlarge, nor modify
the substantive rights of any litigant," 2 the third-party plaintiff must as-
sert a substantive legal basis for maintaining the claim.33 Once a deriva-
tive claim is successfully pleaded, however, Rule 18 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure permits the third-party plaintiff to assert any other
claim against the third-party defendant that arises out of the same trans-
action or occurrence as the initial claim.34 After a third-party defendant
has been properly impleaded, it may participate fully in the litigation of
the primary claims asserted by the plaintiff. This includes assertion of any
defenses that the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim 35 and ob-
taining discovery in the main action. 6
0474, 1994 WL 584692, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1994) (stating that "'the mere fact that the
alleged third-party claim arises from the same transaction or set of facts as the original
claim is not enough"'); International Paving Sys. v. Van-MIlo, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 682, 687
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 1446, at 378-79); United States v. Berk
& Berk, 767 F. Supp. 593, 604 (D.N.J. 1991) ("A third-party claim is not proper where it is
separate and independent from the claim alleged in the complaint, even where it arises out
of the same facts as the plaintiff's action.").
31. See, e.g., Stewart v. American Int'l Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196,200 (9th Cir. 1988)
("The crucial characteristic of a Rule 14 claim is that defendant is attempting to transfer to
the third-part defendant the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff"); Ken-
neth Leventhal & Co. v. Joyner Wholesale Co., 736 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1984) (providing
that third-party liability must be "dependent upon the outcome of the main claim" or "sec-
ondary liable as a contributor to the defendant"); Ez-Tixz, 1995 WL 77589, at *2 ("In order
to implead a third party the defendant must show that he is found liable to the plaintiff,
then the third party will be liable to the defendant."); International Paving 866 F. Supp. at
686 (stating that "for impleader to be available, the third party defendant must be liable to
the original defendant, or that the third party must necessarily be liable over to the defend-
ant for all or part of the plaintiff's recovery, or that the defendant must attempt to pass on
to the third party all or part of the liability asserted against the defendant") (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
32. Ez-Tixz, 1995 WL 77589, at *4; see also Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 333
(7th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Ferris State College, 493 F. Supp. 707, 718 (W.D. Mich. 1980);
Brennan v. Emerald Renovators, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1057, 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
33. See, eg., Ez-Tixz, 1995 WL 77589, at *4; Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F.
Supp. 1180, 1185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 18; see, e.g., First Golden Bancorp. v. Weiszmann, 942 F.2d 726,730
(10th Cir. 1991); United States v. City of Twin Falls, 806 F.2d 862, 866-68 (9th Cir. 1986); In
re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also 6 WRIGHT
ET AL, supra note 30, § 1452, at 414. Additional claims that do not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence as the derivative third-party claim may be asserted if they inde-
pendently satisfy the tests for jurisdiction and venue. Id. at 414-15.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a); see also 6 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 1457, at 440-41.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 770 F. Supp. 954, 961 (D.N.J. 1991) (discussing
third-party defendants' participation in discovery process).
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E. Preemption Doctrine and the FCA
The Supremacy Clause 37 bestows on Congress broad authority to pre-
empt state statutory and common law. Since the advent of the modem
preemption doctrine,3 1 the central question in preemption cases has been
whether Congress intended to exercise this "well established" power. 9
Because the decision to preempt state law is a matter of congressional
discretion, the role of the courts in reviewing the preemptive scope of a
particular statute is limited to ascertaining legislative intent, be it express
or implied."' To that end, courts "examine the explicit statutory language
and the structure and purpose of the [particular federal] statute"'" at
issue.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged three versions of the preemp-
tion doctrine: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemp-
tion. Express preemption, as its name suggests, is found where Congress
states in the text of a statute its intention to displace state authority in a
particular area.' Field preemption is a form of implied preemption
wherein "Congress' intent to supersede state law may be inferred because
'[t]he scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it."''43 When "the Act of Congress... touch[es] a field in which the fed-
eral interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject," the courts apply
37. U.S. CoNsTr., art. VI, cl. 2.
38. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941).
39. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
40. "ITihe question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one
of congressional intent. 'The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone."' Allis-Chal-
mers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,208 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
41. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990).
42. See, e.g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1995); Ingersoll-Rand,
498 U.S. at 138; see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L.
Rnv. 767,808 (1994). For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ER-
ISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988), explicitly provides that "any and all State laws...
relat[ing] to any employee benefit plan" are superseded by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1988).
43. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (federal law occupies the field of nuclear safety
regulation).
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field preemption to prevent the application of state law."
Even when Congress has chosen not to occupy an entire regulatory
field, a court may find the conflict preemption doctrine applicable to the
extent that state law is in "actual conflict" with federal law.45 Such a
conflict may arise either (1) when "compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility,"46 or (2) when state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."'47 Under any of these theories, the
court's ultimate task "is to determine whether state regulation is consis-
tent with the structure and purpose of the [federal statute, ... [1]ooking
to 'the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy ....
The FCA does not contain an express preemption clause. Moreover, in
enacting the FCA, Congress did not draft a scheme of federal regulation
sufficiently pervasive to support the conclusion that there was no further
"room in the field" for state tort and contract law. Therefore, only con-
flict preemption can possibly result in the dismissal of state causes of ac-
tion that impede the attainment of Congress' objectives in enacting the
FCA.
F. The FCA Prohibits Claims for Contribution and Indemnification
Since the 1986 amendments, defendants have repeatedly attempted to
shift to others a portion of the financial burden imposed by the FCA (as
well as associated expenses and attorneys' fees) by asserting claims for
indemnification or contribution against qui tam relators or alleged third-
party joint tortfeasors.49 While the text of the Act is silent on the availa-
44. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (quoting Rice v.
Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
45. See, e.g., Freightliner Corp., 115 S. Ct. at 1487; Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v.
State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 509 (1989).
46. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
47. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (citation omitted). Similar to this sec-
ond form of conflict preemption, there is also "frustration preemption," sometimes viewed
as a distinct, fourth type of preemption. See Gardbaum, supra note 42, at 808 n.206.
48. Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992)
(quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987)).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Nardone, 782 F. Supp. 996, 999 (M.D. Pa. 1990). Contri-
bution is a right by which a defendant who has paid more than his just portion of a liability
shared with several persons is entitled to recovery against those others to obtain payment
of their respective shares. 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution § 1 (1985). Indemnification is "a
right which inures to a person who has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which,
as between himself and another, should have been discharged by the other." 41 AM. JUR.
2D Indemnity § 1 (1968). While the two terms are often used interchangeably, they do not
mean the same thing. Indemnity involves complete reimbursement for what another
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bility of contribution and indemnification,50 federal courts have consist-
ently refused to recognize a right to contribution or indemnification
under the FCA or federal common law.51 As explained by the Ninth Cir-
cuit, given its purpose "to deter future fraudulent claims, as well as
recoup the government's losses due to fraud[,] ... [t]he FCA is in no way
intended to ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers by providing defend-
ants with a remedy against a qui tam plaintiff with 'unclean hands.' 5 2
II. ANALYsIs
A. Cases Addressing Preemptive Scope of the FCA
In addition to using claims for contribution and indemnification under
federal law, qui tam defendants have also sought to shift FCA liability
pursuant to third-party claims asserting state law causes of action. These
tactics raise the question whether such claims are preempted by the
FCA.53 The first case to examine the preemptive scope of the FCA was
should have paid. By contrast, contribution involves a proportionate reimbursement by
the defendant for his ratable share of the total amount of the liability. Id. § 3.
50. Mortgages, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1991)
("The FCA does not speak to the right of contribution or indemnification.").
51. See, eg., Mortgages, 934 F.2d at 214 (providing that no basis in the FCA or federal
common law for a right to contribution or indemnity in FCA actions); Nardone, 782 F.
Supp. at 999 (FCA defendant in a non-qui tam suit precluded as a matter of law from
seeking indemnification from a third-party defendant); United States ex reL Stephens v.
Prabhu, No. CV-S-92-653-LDG, 1994 WL 761237, at *1 (D. Nev. Dec. 14, 1994) (holding
that "[n]either the FCA nor federal common law provides a right to contribution or indem-
nification in a FCA action"); see also Israel Discount Bank Ltd. v. Entin, 951 F.2d 311,314
n.9 (11th Cir. 1992) (acknowledging, in dicta, the FCA's prohibition against claims for con-
tribution or indemnification); United States v. Kennedy, 431 F. Supp. 877, 878 (C.D. Cal.
1977) (stating that if found liable under FCA, defendant/third party plaintiffs are not enti-
tled to indemnification from the third party defendant, "even if it can be proven that he
too would have been jointly and severally liable").
52. Mortgages, 934 F.2d at 213. The courts have similarly held that contribution or
indemnification are unavailable under many federal statutes. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliffe Materials, 451 U.S. 630,646 (1981) (holding that there is no right to contribution
under the antitrust laws); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S.
77, 94-95 (1981) (holding that there is no right to contribution under Title VII or the Equal
Pay Act); Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 483-84 (3d Cir. 1995) (providing that
although contribution is available under the federal securities laws, there is no right to
indemnification).
53. Many of the cases addressed in this section do not specifically discuss the preemp-
tion doctrine or explain their holdings in these terms. However, the courts' rationale that
state law claims would undermine the FCA amounts to the application of the doctrine sub
silentio. These cases are therefore distinguishable from those decided under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6672, which allows the Internal Revenue Service to assess penalties for unpaid taxes.
Courts have long prohibited defendants in § 6672 actions from filing third-party state law
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Mortgages, Inc. v. United States District Court.5 4 Mortgages was a mort-
gage lending company that accepted applications for loans insured by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). The de-
fendants, debtors under the HUD program, filed loan applications with
Mortgages that allegedly contained false and misleading statements.55
After the debtors defaulted on the HUD-backed loans, Mortgages en-
tered into a settlement with the government to indemnify it for the losses
sustained as a result of the loans, and thereafter it filed a qui tam action
under the FCA to recover against the debtors.56 In response, the debtor
defendants fied state law third-party claims against Mortgages and its
president, the qui tam relators, alleging breach of contract, breach of cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negli-
gence, negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy.57 The relators
moved to dismiss, arguing that the defendants impermissibly sought a
form of contribution or indemnification through their counterclaims.5 8
After the district court rejected these arguments and denied the motion,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a petition for manda-
mus and ordered the counterclaims dismissed.59 Concluding that a right
to contribution or indemnification did not exist under the FCA or the
federal common law, the Ninth Circuit determined that "there can be no
right to assert state law counterclaims that, if prevailed on, would end in
the same result" as contribution or indemnification.6" The court there-
fore directed the district court to dismiss all of the defendants'
counterclaims.61
claims for contribution on the grounds that such claims would complicate and prolong the
efficient collection of taxes. See, eg., Carlucci v. United States, 793 F. Supp. 482, 485-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Cook v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 217, 220 (M.D. Pa. 1991). Such
claims can, however, be asserted in independent lawsuits. In the FCA context, by contrast,
the courts' rationale-that the availability of contribution or indemnity would undermine
Congress' objectives in enacting the FCA-applies with equal vigor whether or not such
claims are asserted in the FCA action or an independent lawsuit. But cf. United States ex
reL Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 763, 769-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (hold-
ing that notwithstanding their status as compulsory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13, an FCA defendant must bring all counterclaims in a separate action).
54. 934 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1991).
55. Id at 210.
56. Id at 210-11.
57. Id. at 211 n.1.
58. Id at 211.
59. Id at 211, 214.
60. Id. at 214. Although in this passage the Mortgages court referred to the allegations
as counterclaims, it recognized earlier in its opinion that they were, in fact, third-party
claims, albeit ones filed against the relators. Id. at 211 n.2.
61. Id. at 214.
The Buck Stops Here
While not labeling its analysis as an application of the preemption doc-
trine, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Mortgages was clearly based on con-
flict preemption principles. The court explicitly found that state law
claims that would allow FCA violators to reduce the financial burden of
their fraud would frustrate the object and policy of the Act: to punish past
fraudulent conduct without allowing contribution even from joint
tortfeasors who participated in the fraud.62
This reading was confirmed in United States v. Warning,63 which fol-
lowed Mortgages and held that state law claims for contribution are pre-
empted by the FCA.64 Warning involved claims of Medicare and
Medicaid fraud in the sale of medical supplies against three individuals
and seven corporations. 65 The government alleged, inter alia, violations
of the FCA and state law. 66 Several of the defendants filed third-party
claims asserting various state law causes of action as well as a claim for
contribution against their lawyers.67 Ruling that "any right the [defend-
ants] might have to contribution under state law is pre-empted by the
[FCA]," the court dismissed the third-party complaint.68 In support of its
holding, the Warning court explicitly stated what was implicit in the Mort-
gages opinion: there is an actual conflict between state law contribution
claims and the FCA because such state law claims would undermine the
FCA's goal of deterring future misconduct and compensating the
government. 69
In Israel Discount Bank Ltd. v. Entin,7° the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit also agreed with the Mortgages preemption analysis, al-
beit in dicta. In holding that a suit fied by a former FCA defendant
against another defendant was barred by the principles of res judicata, the
Entin court noted that the defendant's claims for violations of the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act71 ("RICO"), fraudulent
concealment, and conspiracy to defraud were "nothing more than a
poorly disguised attempt to evade" the FCA's prohibition against contri-
62. Id.
63. 1994 WL 396432, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 1994).
64. Id.
65. Id at *1.
66. Id
67. Id. at "1, *7.
68. Id. at *8.
69. Id.
70. 951 F.2d 311 (11th Cir. 1992).
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
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bution and indemnification and therefore were preempted.
72
The same issue arose in Burch ex rel. United States v. Piqua Engineer-
ing, Inc.' There, the qui tam defendant filed counterclaims against the
relators alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of loyalty, breach
of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of fair representation, and defama-
tion.74 The district court denied the relators' motion to dismiss the coun-
terclaims.75 Framing the question as involving the "availability of
counterclaims in a False Claims Act case," 76 the court rejected the rela-
tors' arguments for two, apparently independent, reasons. First, the
counterclaims did not allege that the relators "were participants in the
substantive FCA violations" set forth in the qui tam complaint.77 Instead,
the breach of contract counterclaim was based on the allegation that the
relators improperly performed their jobs, and the remaining counter-
claims were based on allegedly false and damaging statements to the me-
dia made by the relators.7" Second, because the counterclaims were
compulsory under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore
could not be asserted in an independent action, the court concluded that
dismissing them would violate the qui tam defendant's procedural due
process rights.7 9 To avoid "chilling" the initiation of qui tam suits, the
court ordered that the counterclaims be tried separately from the FCA
claims.80
The Ninth Circuit refined its preemption analysis in United States ex rel.
Madden v. General Dynamics Corp.8s Madden involved allegations by
qui tam relators, who were former and current employees of General Dy-
namics, that General Dynamics made misrepresentations to the United
States Navy concerning the testing and development of a missile sys-
72. Entin, 951 F.2d at 314 n.6, 315 n.9.
73. 145 F.R.D. 452 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
74. Id. at 455-56.
75. Id. at 456.
76. It.
77. lIt
78. Id.
79. Id at 457. For this reason, the district court explicitly disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Mortgages and the district court opinion in United States ex rel Mad-
den v. General Dynamics Corp., No. CV-88-5352 WMB (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 1992), rev'd, 4
F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 1993). Despite Burch's criticism of Mortgages, the Ninth Circuit's subse-
quent decision in Madden, discussed infra note 81 and accompanying text, appears consis-
tent with Burch.
80. Burch, 145 F.R.D. at 457-58.
81. 4 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 1993).
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tem. General Dynamics filed eight state law counterclaims against the
relators, alleging, inter alia, breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, libel, fraud, and misappropriation of trade secrets.83 The district
court granted the relators' motion to dismiss all of the corporation's
counterclaims under the analysis applied in Mortgages, despite acknowl-
edging that the counterclaims were compulsory and that some of them
did not seek indemnification or contribution, but rather "independent
damages." 84 Specifically, the district court concluded that counterclaims
for so-called independent damages presented no significant difference
from other state law claims and were impermissible "because they
[would] have the practical effect of providing a defendant the opportunity
to offset its liability by recovering damages from qui tam plaintiffs."85
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court and reversed the
dismissal of counterclaims for independent damages. The court ex-
plained that, while "[c]ounterclaims for contribution or indemnification
by definition only have the effect of offsetting liability[,] [c]ounterclaims
for independent damages.., are not dependent on a qui tam defendant's
liability. '8 6 Because a qui tam defendant's counterclaims often will be
compulsory under Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
consequently could not be asserted in a separate action, the Madden
court concluded that a prohibition on counterclaims seeking independent
damages would violate procedural due process.87
While holding that qui tam defendants can bring such counterclaims,
the court attempted to minimize the risk that this holding would result in
an "end run around Mortgages. 88 Thus, the Madden court indicated that
the proper course in FCA litigation was to determine the qui tam defend-
ant's liability before addressing the counterclaims. If the qui tam defend-
ant is found liable under the FCA, then all counterclaims-even those for
independent damages-should be dismissed "on the ground that they will
have the effect of providing for indemnification or contribution."8 9 By
contrast, if the court finds the qui tam defendant not liable under the
82. Id. at 829.
83. Id.
84. See Strader, supra note 10, at 741-46.
85. Madden, 4 F.3d at 830.
86. Id. at 830-31.
87. Id. at 831 (citing Burch ex reL United States v. Piqua Engineering, Inc. 145 F.R.D.
452, 457 (S.D. Ohio 1992)). Madden recognized that other courts had dismissed counter-
claims brought by qui tam defendants to recover independent damages. ILd. at 830 n.1.
88. Id. at 831.
89. Id.
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FCA, it may pursue its counterclaims. 0
The Madden analysis was applied to third-party claims in United States
ex rel. Stephens v. Prabhu.91 In Stephens, which involved false Medicare
reimbursement claims, the qui tam defendants filed counterclaims against
several of the relators for libel, trade libel, abuse of process, malicious
prosecution, and third-party claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and
negligent misrepresentation against the persons who owned the defend-
ant health care entity at the time that the allegedly false claims were sub-
mitted.92 The district court granted the United States' and the relators'
motions to dismiss all third-party claims.93 Because each of the defend-
ants' third-party claims sought "to hold the Third-Party Defendants liable
to the extent that any false claims are proven at trial," the Stephens court
concluded they did not seek damages "independent" of the qui tam de-
fendants' FCA liability and were, therefore, preempted.94 The district
court also held that the counterclaims were for independent damages and
therefore could be pursued should the qui tam defendants prevail in the
FCA action.95 Following Madden, however, the court held that if the qui
tam defendants are found liable under the FCA, the counterclaims would
be dismissed as providing contribution or indemnification. 9
6
B. Implications of the Preemption Analysis
The series of cases summarized above provides strong support for
counsel attempting to extricate a client who has been impleaded into a
pending qui tam action. While it is well-settled that neither contribution
nor indemnity for FCA liability are available under federal law,97 Mort-
gages and its progeny have expanded this principle to prohibit qui tam
defendants from asserting any claim, even one based on state law, that, by
permitting the qui tam defendant to transfer at least some of its FCA
liability to another party, would be the functional equivalent of contribu-
tion or indemnification. As a consequence, claims for breach of contract,
breach of warranty, and negligent misrepresentation-to name just some
of the theories most likely to be invoked-all fall within the rubric of
90. Id
91. 1994 WL 761237 (D. Nev. Dec. 14, 1994).
92. Id. at *1.
93. Id
94. Id
95. Id. It appears that neither the qui tam relators nor the United States moved to
dismiss the counterclaims on grounds of preemption. See id.
96. Id
97. See supra note 49-52 and accompanying text.
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state law causes of action preempted by the FCA.98
In response to these arguments, particularly in the circuits that have
not yet addressed directly the FCA's preemptive scope, qui tam defend-
ants likely will argue that third-party claims actually further the goals of
the FCA by holding another wrongdoer-the third-party defendant-re-
sponsible for the false claims submitted to the government. This argu-
ment is flawed in a number of respects. *Most significantly, it ignores the
Supreme Court's articulation of preemption principles. As the Court has
explained, in determining whether state law hinders the implementation
of a federal law,99 "'it is not enough to say that the ultimate goal of both
federal and state law' is the same."100 State law will be "preempted if it
interferes with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to
reach th[at] goal."'01 In enacting the FCA, Congress specified the pre-
cise amounts to be exacted from those adjudged liable for filing false or
fraudulent claims-treble damages and a civil penalty of between $5,000
and $10,000 per diem.'0 2 State law remedies that reduce this amount by
shifting liability to other parties interfere with the congressional judgment
regarding the magnitude of the liability necessary to deter the filing of
false or fraudulent claims and to punish those who violate the FCA.
Moreover, these state law claims undermine Congress' intent to prevent
wrongdoers from shifting the consequences of their FCA violations by
permitting remedies among co-defendants and other parties with "un-
clean hands."'0 3
The preemption arguments are, if anything, stronger in circumstances
in which the putative third-party defendant's FCA liability arising from
the transactions at issue in the pending qui tam action has already been
98. Mortgages and its progeny have correctly applied the preemption principle to state
law causes of action that, if allowed, would have the practical effect of providing "contribu-
tion" or "indemnification." In similar contexts, courts have examined how a particular
cause of action would function, not the label placed on it. See, eg., In re United States Oil
& Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489,496 (11th Cir. 1992) (providing that "'a rose by any other name
is still a rose,"' and the fraud and negligence claims asserted "'are nothing more than
claims for contribution or indemnification with a slight change in wording"'); International
Paving Sys., Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 682, 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (looking to "the
substance of the claim" rather than "the form of the ... claim" in determining whether a
third.party claim complaint states a claim derivative of the main claim under Rule 14(a)).
99. Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,103 (1992) (citation
omitted).
100. Id. (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987)).
101. Id
102. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
103. Mortgages, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Nev., 934 F.2d 209,213
(9th Cir. 1991).
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determined, either through prior litigation or settlement with the United
States or because the government decided not to institute an FCA action
at all. First, in such circumstances, third-party claims based on state law
can impose liability in excess of that dictated by Congress, particularly if
the third-party claims seek compensation for the expenses and attorneys'
fees incurred by the third-party plaintiff in defending against the govern-
ment's FCA action. Just as significantly, in the context of a previous set-
tlement or a government decision not to institute FCA claims against the
third-party defendant, permitting such claims to proceed undermines "the
primacy of the Executive Branch in prosecuting false-claims actions."' 1 4
By settling with or not proceeding against the putative third-party de-
fendant, the government made a judgment regarding the proper liability
that party should incur as a result of its actions, and such a judgment falls
squarely within the power to "investigate and litigate offenses against the
United States,"10 which the Constitution assigns to the Executive
Branch, not a self-interested litigant.106 Therefore, third-party claims that
undermine that judgment raise separation of powers concerns.10 7
Moreover, preemption principles can be applied readily in the context
of third-party claims lodged in an FCA action.108 As explained above, a
104. United States ex rel Taxpayers Against Fraud v. General Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032,
1041 (6th Cir. 1994).
105. United States ex ret Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1088
(C.D. Cal. 1989).
106. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,832 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
138 (1976); United States ex rel. Taxpayers Against Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1041.
107. The constitutional question whether permitting the shifting of FCA liability to a
party with whom the government has resolved its claims impermissibly interferes with the
Executive Branch's enforcement of the FCA is distinct from the broader question whether
permitting a qui tam relator to file an action on behalf of the United States violates the
separation of powers doctrine. The federal courts that have addressed the latter issue and
related constitutional challenges to the qui tam provisions of the FCA have uniformly re-
jected them. See, e.g., United States ex reL Taxpayers Against Fraud, 41 F.3d at 1040-42
(rejecting arguments that the qui tam provisions violate the separation of powers doctrine
and the Appointments Clause); United States ex rel Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 747-
60 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting arguments that the qui tam provisions violate Article III's
standing requirement, the separation of powers doctrine, the Appointments Clause, and
due process). However, some commentators have forcefully argued that the qui tam provi-
sions are, in fact, unconstitutional on several grounds. See, e.g., James T. Blanch, Note, The
Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
701, 767 (1993).
108. Indeed, the preemption argument is stronger when addressed to third-party claims
than to the counterclaims at issue in Mortgages, Madden, and Burch. In permitting state
law counterclaims to proceed, the Madden and Burch courts were motivated in part by a
belief that dismissing compulsory counterclaims would deprive the qui tam defendant of
procedural due process. Madden, 4 F.3d at 831; Burch, 145 F.R.D. at 457. Since third-
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third-party action properly lies only when the third-party plaintiff asserts
a derivative claim that seeks to hold the third-party defendant liable for
at least part of the claim asserted by the plaintiff in the main action.10 9
By definition, therefore, such third-party claims must seek contribution
or indemnification in substance, if not in name,' and Mortgages and its
progeny squarely preempt such claims. In the language of Madden and
Prabhu, those claims permitted by Rule 14(a) are not "independent" of
the plaintiff's FCA claims and therefore are preempted. Once such
claims are dismissed, the third-party complaint will not satisfy Rule
14(a)'s requirement that at least one claim in the complaint seeks to hold
the third-party defendant derivatively liable for the third-party plaintiff's
liability to the plaintiff. Failing to satisfy this mandatory requirement, the
surviving claims in the third-party complaint must be dismissed."'
More difficult issues arise if-as is frequently the case-the United
States pairs its FCA claims with federal common law causes of action." 2
To the extent that any third-party complaint seeks to hold the third-party
defendant liable for the qui tam defendant's FCA liability, those claims
are preempted for the reasons explained above. Even after these claims
are dismissed, however, the third-party complaint would still include via-
ble derivative claims by which the third-party plaintiff seeks to shift liabil-
ity under the federal common law causes of action to the third-party
defendant. Consequently, the third-party complaint could not be dis-
missed in its entirety under Rule 14(a). While escaping the FCA's treble
damages and statutory penalties provisions, the third-party defendant
party claims are never compulsory under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this con-
cern is simply absent from an analysis of third-party practice under the FCA. See 6
WRIGHTr ET AL., supra note 30, § 1446, at 355. Counsel should be cautious, however, in
relying too heavily on the absence of due process considerations in the context of third-
party claims. By suggesting that barring compulsory counterclaims would violate due pro-
cess, the Madden and Burch courts appeared to believe that the only bar to raising such
claims in another action is their status as compulsory under Rule 13. If such claims are
preempted, however, they are eliminated completely by operation of the Supremacy
Clause. Preemption of state law claims, even where federal law provides no analogous
cause of action, has never been held to pose a due process problem.
109. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
110. See International Paving Sys., Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 682, 686-87
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that a third-party complaint stating a claim for breach of contract,
although not contribution or indemnification in those terms, is sufficiently derivative of the
main claim to be properly asserted under Rule 14(a)).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Olavarrieta, 812 F.2d 640, 643 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 851 (1987); Kenneth Leventhal & Co. v. Joyner Wholesale Co., 736 F.2d 29,31-32
(2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Berk & Berk, 767 F. Supp. 593, 604-05 (D.N.J. 1991).
112. See supra note 28.
1995]
60 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:41
might still be forced to participate in the FCA litigation and to face po-
tential single damages exposure derivative of the defendant's federal
common law liability.
Faced with this situation, the third-party defendant should aggressively
argue that the factual nexus for the government's FCA claims is identical
to that for the federal common law claims and that conflict preemption
still governs. After all, the qui tam defendant would be attempting to
impose upon the third-party defendant liability arising from precisely the
same conduct that is at issue in the FCA claims. By providing a form of
contribution or indemnification, such claims would potentially have the
same effect of "ameliorat[ing] the liability of wrongdoers" that the courts
have held is inconsistent with the FCA."13
Such an approach has support in related areas of the law. In In re
United States Oil & Gas Litigation,"1 4 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the common problem of determining
the proper scope to be accorded to settlement bar orders.1 5 In that case,
a settling defendant sought to assert an allegedly "independent" cross-
claim for fraud and negligence. The court rejected this effort, concluding
that "the propriety of the settlement bar order should turn upon the in-
terrelatedness of the claims that it precludes, not upon the labels which
parties attach to those claims. ,116 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit determined
that claims are not truly independent if they "arise out of the same facts
as. those underlying the litigation." The same standard should apply in
the FCA preemption context."17
C. Alternative Strategies
Several additional strategic avenues may be pursued to defeat third-
party claims. Perhaps the most promising of these strategies is to move
the court to strike third-party claims on discretionary grounds. 1 8 Under
113. See, e.g., Mortgages, 934 F.2d at 213 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981)).
114. 967 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992).
115. Settlement bar orders, common in the context of partial settlements in federal se-
curities litigation, function to encourage settlements by finally discharging all obligations of
settling defendants and barring any further litigation of claims by nonsettling defendants
against settling defendants. Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 486 (3d Cir. 1995). The
nonsettling defendants are entitled to a set-off, which may be computed in various ways,
against any judgment entered against them. Id.
116. In re United States Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d at 496.
117. Id.
118. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) ("Any party may move to strike the third-party claim
.r)
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Rule 14(a), the district court retains broad discretion to dismiss a third-
party complaint if the complaint (a) prejudices the plaintiff or the third-
party defendant,119 (b) introduces unrelated legal or factual issues into
the litigation, 2 (c) unduly complicates the litigation,' 2 ' or (d) appears to
lack substance." Third-party claims asserted in FCA actions likely will
necessitate factual inquiries that are substantially different from those in
the main action (e.g., what representations were made by the third-party
defendant to the qui tam defendant, what was the contractual relationship
and course of dealings between those two parties, etc.) and will force
both the court and the jury to apply state law governing several different
causes of action. By contrast, the FCA action itself may involve only the
narrow question of the qui tam defendant's knowledge and intent regard-
ing the claims submitted to the government. Application of these issues
will necessarily be case-specific and the district court has broad discretion
in ruling on a motion to strike on these grounds."
Similarly, a third-party defendant could seek to have the district court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the third-party claims.
In 1990, Congress adopted the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,12
which codified the doctrines of pendant and ancillary jurisdiction by ad-
ding Section 1367 to the Judicial Code. Under Section 1367(c), the dis-
trict court may dismiss a third-party claim, even one over which it
otherwise has jurisdiction, if, inter alia, "the claim raises a novel or com-
plex issue of State law," "the claim substantially predominates over the
claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction," or
"in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for de-
clining jurisdiction."' The circuits disagree about the extent to which
enactment of Section 1367 narrowed the courts' traditional case law on
119. See, e.g., Ez-Tixz, Inc. v. Hit-T1x, Inc., No. Crv.A.93-3791, 1995 WL 77589, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 1995); International Paving Sys., Inc. v. Van-Tulco, Inc., 866 F. Supp.
682, 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Metz, 115 F.R.D. 216,218 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
120. See, e.g., Fischer v. Presbyterian-Univ. of Pa. Medical Ctr., No. Crv.A.91-2884,
1991 WL 231590, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1991); Blais Constr. Co. v. Hanover Square
Assocs.-I, 733 F. Supp. 149, 159 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
121. See, e.g., Fischer, 1991 WL 231590, at *2; Blais Constr., 733 F. Supp. at 159; Valdez
v. City of Farmington, 580 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.N.M. 1984).
122. See, eg., Blais Constr., 733 F. Supp. at 159.
123. See, e-g., International Paving Sys., 866 F. Supp. at 687; Blais Constr., 733 F. Supp.
at 158; E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Jupiter Dev. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
124. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)). The Act expressly overruled Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), which
rejected the doctrine of pendant party jurisdiction.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)-(2), (4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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discretionary dismissal,126 which permitted dismissal based on "consider-
ations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants. '127
Nonetheless, it is clear that the district courts retain substantial discretion
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on these grounds. 28
Even if the third-party claims are not preempted, the district court could
determine that, given the absence of a right to contribution or indemnifi-
cation under the FCA and in light of the potential complications and in-
terference with the FCA litigation caused by third-party claims,
compelling circumstances require dismissal and pursuit of these claims in
a separate action. 29 In United States ex rel. Public Integrity, Inc. v. Thera-
peutic Technology, Inc.,130 a federal district court in Alabama recently
dismissed third-party claims in an FCA action on the basis of
Section 1367.'13
Counsel should carefully consider the risks of extricating a client from
a third-party claim in this manner. Unlike the preemption ground dis-
cussed above, discretionary dismissal under either Rule 14(a) or Sec-
tion 1367(c) does not extinguish the claims asserted in the third-party
126. Diven v. Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l, 38 F.3d 598, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Compare Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1181-82 (7th Cir.
1993) ("the new statute is intended to codify rather than to alter the judge-made principles
of pendant and pendant party jurisdiction") with Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v.
United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1556-60 (9th Cir. 1994) (Section 1367 has nar-
rowed the discretionary basis on which dismissal is proper).
127. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
128. See, e.g., Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 276-77 (7th Cir. 1994); Executive
Software, 24 F.3d at 1557; Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, 983 F.2d 1277, 1284-
85 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Denis McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Stat-
ute, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 975-77 (1992).
129. For example, in Carlucci v. United States, 793 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), the
government instituted an action to collect penalties arising from the nonpayment of taxes
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6672. Id. at 483-84. Although courts have repeatedly disallowed
state claims for contribution from being asserted in such actions, the defendant filed a
third-party claim seeking contribution from the successors of his business. Idt The district
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4), concluding that the
third-party claims would unduly complicate and prolong matters and violate "the long-
standing rule ... that contribution actions should not be heard during the pendency of...
§ 6672 [actions]." Id. at 486; see also Ringer v. United States, 153 F.R.D. 594, 596 (N.D.
Tex. 1993).
130. 895 F. Supp. 294 (S.D. Ala. 1995).
131. In Therapeutic Technology, the qui tam defendant filed state law third-party claims
for breach of contract, breach of warranty, and fraud. Id at 295. Relying on Mortgages
and Stephens, among other cases, the court found that "[t]he fact that qui tam defendants
lack a right to bring claims that will have the effect of offsetting FCA liability" constituted
a compelling reason to dismiss the third-party claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). Id. at 296.
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complaint, but merely requires that they be asserted in an action in-
dependent of the FCA lawsuit.132 As a result of such dismissal, however,
the third-party defendant loses the right to participate in the qui tam de-
fendant's defense of the FCA claims asserted against it. Should the qui
tam defendant lose in the FCA action, he will no doubt argue that that
judgment binds the entities to whom he seeks to shift responsibility for
the liability. 13  If the putative third-party defendant believes that the qui
tam defendant will not adequately present meritorious defenses against
the FCA claims, it may be prudent as a matter of strategy to incur the
immediate litigation expenses and remain a party to the FCA action.134
A final alternative that avoids the problem identified in the previous
paragraph is a motion for a separate trial of the FCA and third-party
claims. Such a motion is authorized both by Rule 14(a) 31 and by
Rule 42(b), which permits the separate trial of third-party claims "in fur-
therance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
will be conducive to expedition and economy."'136 Collectively, these pro-
visions vest district courts with substantial discretion in determining
whether to order that the third-party complaint be tried separately from
the qui tam action. 37 The presence of any of the factors mentioned in
Rule 42(b) is by itself sufficient grounds for a district court to order a
132. See 6 WRIG-rr ET AL., supra note 30, § 1463, at 470.
133. The general rule, of course, is that only a person who was a party to a prior action,
or who is in privity with such a party, may be bound by the prior judgment. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989); Gilbert v. Ben-Asher, 900 F.2d 1407, 1410 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990); Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of Cherry Hill, 799
F. Supp. 450, 457-58 (D.N.J. 1992). Even a party required to indemnify the defendant in
the prior action traditionally would be bound by the judgment only if the defendant
vouched in the indemnitor-a process by which it would provide notice of the action and
tender an opportunity to control the defense. 18 CHARLES A. WiGH-rr Er AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4452, at 440 (1981). These rules, of course, are not without
exceptions. The qui tam defendant may argue, for example, that it adequately represented
the putative third-party defendant's interest on the question whether the claims submitted
were in fact false, and that the third-party defendant, rather than attempt to extricate itself
from the FCA action, had a duty to participate. See id, §§ 4452,4457; cf. Lynch v. Merrell-
National Labs., 646 F. Supp. 856, 859-62 (D. Mass. 1986).
134. Of course, the putative third-party defendant could seek to participate as amicus
after dismissal, though amicus filings would be ineffective at presenting a defense at trial
and could be filed only with the district court's permission.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (any party may move for "severance or separate trial" of
third-party claims).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
137. See, e.g., Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 849 F. Supp. 785,790 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Ismail v.
Cohen, 706 F. Supp. 243, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd in part, rev'd and vacated in part on
other grounds, 899 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1990).
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separate trial.'
38
The principal factors relevant in exercising a court's discretion to order
separate trials are "whether continued joinder will serve to complicate
the litigation unduly or will prejudice the other parties in any substantial
way. ' ' 139 Severance is appropriate to protect the third-party defendant
from the "contamination" that may result by being associated in the ju-
rors' minds with the qui tam defendant.140 Courts have also repeatedly
recognized that bifurcation is appropriate where the first trial may obvi-
ate the necessity for, or narrow the scope of, a second one.141 Separate
trial may also be appropriate when the legal theories at issue in the origi-
nal and third-party actions differ, 42 or when jury confusion might result
from the presentation in one trial of divergent standards and factual evi-
dence related to the two sets of claims.143 When the district court orders
the third-party claims to be tried separately from, and after conclusion of
the litigation regarding, the main claims, it has discretion to order that
discovery related to the third-party claims be stayed pending disposition
of the claims in the main action.'"
138. See, e.g., Ricciuti v. New York City Transit Auth., 796 F. Supp. 84, 86 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Willemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429,
1433 (D. Del. 1989); see also 5 J. W. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcnca J 42.03[1], at
42-43 (2d ed. 1995) ("Only one of Rule 42(b)'s conditions need be met for the court to
order a separate trial.").
139. 6 WRirHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 1460, at 457; see, e.g., Dewald v. Minster Press
Co., 494 F.2d 795, 798 (6th Cir. 1974); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 801 F. Supp.
517, 528 (D. Utah 1992); C & G Constr. Co. v. Morrison Assurance Co., 96 F.R.D. 670,672
(S.D. Ga. 1983); FED. R. Crv. P. 14, advisory committee's note to 1963 Amendment to
Rule 14 ("the court has discretion ... to sever the third-party claim or accord it separate
trial if confusion or prejudice would otherwise result").
140. See, e.g., Monaghan v. SZS 33 Assocs., L.P., 827 F. Supp. 233,244 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
In re New York Asbestos Litig., 149 F.R.D. 490, 500-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Ismail, 706 F.
Supp. at 251. This may be an important factor if, for example, the government has alleged
conduct by the qui tam defendant that is unrelated to the third-party defendant and that, if
proved, clearly constitutes intentional fraud.
141. See, e.g., O'Malley v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 776 F.2d 494,500-01 (5th
Cir. 1985); SCFC ILC, 801 F. Supp. at 528; United States v. Kramer, 770 F. Supp. 954, 959-
60 (D.N.J. 1991); Deagle v. City of N.Y., No.COv.A.90-8203, 1991 WL 267765, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 1991); Carlisle Corp. v. Hayes, 635 F. Supp. 962, 967-68 (S.D. Cal. 1986);
see also 5 MOORE, supra note 138, 1 42.03[1], at 42-51.
142. See Hal Leonard Publishing Corp. v. Future Generations, Inc., No. Ov.A.93-5290,
1994 WL 163987, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1994); Whitted v. United States, No. Civ.A.83-
1169, 1986 WL 5098, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1986).
143. Ismail, 706 F. Supp. at 251; see, e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Lagudi v. Long Island R.R., 775 F. Supp. 73, 74-75
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); 5 MOORE, supra note 138, %1 42.03[1], at 42-61.
144. See, e.g., Hal Leonard Publishing Corp., 1994 WL 163987, at *5; Simpson v. Stand
21, S.A., No. IP93 428C., 1994 WL 735936, at *1-2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 1994); Baxter Int'l,
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Finally, United States ex rel. Madden v. General Dynamics Corp.,145
provides strong support for a motion for a separate trial. As explained
above, 46 in Madden the Ninth Circuit held that the qui tam defendant's
liability under the FCA should be determined before the district court
addresses state law claims asserted by that party.147 If the qui tam de-
fendant ultimately is found liable under the FCA, Madden requires that
the district court then dismiss the state law claims "on the ground that
they will have the effect of providing for indemnification or contribu-
tion.' 48 On the other hand, if the qui tam defendant prevails in the FCA
action, litigation of the state law claims-to the extent that they survive
the determination of nonliability under the FCA-could proceed. 49
III. CONCLUSION
The increasing frequency of qui tam litigation, particularly after the
1986 amendments, coupled with zealous reliance on the FCA by the gov-
ernment, make it ever more likely that a company depending on federal
payments for its products will be named as a third-party defendant in an
FCA action filed against another person or entity. Prudent use of the
preemption analysis described above can be an effective weapon in extri-
cating a client from such litigation.
Inc. v. Cobe Lab., Inc., No. 89C9460, 1992 WL 77665, at *1 (N.D. I1. Apr. 7,1992); see also
5 MooR , supra note 138, 42.0311], at 42-61.
145. 4 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 1993).
146. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
147. Madden, 4 F.3d at 831.
148. Id
149. Id.; see also Burch ex reL United States v. Piqua Engineering, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 452,
457-58 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
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